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Abstract. A concept of uniform complexity is defined and a class of functions is shown to have 
uniform complexity. A special case of these results is used to develop a new digital signature 
method, which makes forging signatures as hard as factoring a large number and which allows 
half of the messages tobe signed directly. The signature production involves only one exponenti- 
ation module a large number and the signature checking the comparison of a fourth and second 
power modulo a large number. Therefore this new method is faster than known methods with 
the same degree of safety. 
d. Introduction 
Signatures hould give the parties involved three kin& if protection. (Let A be 
the originador and B the receiver of a message.) 
(i) AuthentMy. Both party A and party B should be protected against forged 
messages, planted into the communication channel by party C which pretends to 
be party A. 
(ii) U@argenM$y. Party A should be protected against forged messages by party 
B, which I3 claims to have received (properly signed) from party A. 
(iii) No tey,:M&~rz. It must not be possible for party A to subsequently disclaim 
authorship of a signed message to B. 
With digital signatures, the firs-i kind of protection can be guaranteed by using 
appropriate coding techniques which are only known to A and B. The second kind 
of protec”cion is harder to obtain, since B should know enough about the way A 
signs its messages in order to recognize them, and yet should be unable to generate 
them,. *
The tl2r,tid kind of protection is very hard to achieve with digital s&natures since 
the validity of a digital signature on a message is cnly as safe as the entire future 
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protection of the private key used to produce the signature. Unfortunately the 
author of a digital signature can effectively disavow and repudiate his signatures 
at any time, merely by causing his secret key to be made public or ‘C Jmpromised’. 
Thyhen such an event occurs, either by accident or intention, ali messa.+% greviously 
‘signed’ using the gives private key are invalidated, since the only proof of 
validity has been destroyed [18]. This paper does not -provide :. solution for 
this very important problem. It is assu,ned in the remainder hat secret keys are 
not-lost. 
Proposals for digital signatures are given in [ll, 14, 15, 17, 19, r.01. The system 
l>roposed in [l4] is too complicated and it can be simplified considerably while 
making it safer at the same time. The simplified system is a version of a public-key 
sys:em with mrultiple keys which are used only once. The ke:l* idea of the 
Gmplification is that if a party A has to reveal, say 20, keys to a party B for checking 
of 20 enr:odings, this does not imply that party B is able to produce efficiently 20 
correct encodings for another message. This effect can easily be achieved with 
trapdoor one-way functions. 
If the network of communicating parties is sufficiently big it is impractical ho use 
a distinct 2nd secret signature algorithm for every pair of potential users. En their 
innovative paper [4], Diffie and Hellman introduce the notion of a ‘public key 
cryptosystem’, inwhich (among other things) each user makes public a c+ick method 
for recognizing his signatures. The resultant ‘signature directory’ is available to 
anyone, and thus two participating parties can start sending signed messages without 
any special preparation. 
As explained in [13], the via:bilit y e f a digital signatslre system requires that the 
relevant system-breaking computations bc intractable in a sense stronger than the 
one usually defined in comple:tity theory. Even if the problem were proved to be 
exponentially complex (no such result was proved to date), this would only be a 
worst case or average case complexity result. It does not preclude t!he possibility 
that for one key in a thousand the system cannot be broken by an algorithm not 
krown t6) the user. 
Ideally, we want the signature forging function to be intractable almost without 
exception!. Thus we want to capture the idea that signature forging sholuEd be 
uniformly intractable. Since complexity theory is far from an intractability proof 
of a prol,lcsm in it is worth-while to consider signature methods which can be 
proven to I#ave unif&m complexity for forging. Intuitively, a problem has uniform 
comple.xit:q, if even the solution of a few (random) instances would imply the solution 
of a problem which is expected (or proven) to be difficult. 
In orc!er to define uniformity we need to introduce th,e class of functions AR (a 
generalize *I-:m of a definition given in [l], see also [5]). Babai [2] defines AR to be 
the class o:” functions which have an efficient Las Vegas algorithm. A Las, Vegas 
algorithm 3s a randomized algorithm which always, if it arrives at an answer, 
computes 8 correct output, but sometimes it gives no answer (with known failure 
probability),, 
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A randomized algorithy:l is an algorithm which can use coin-tossmg Sn so:me of 
its decisions. Let f”J denote the na: ., ;a1 numb-hers and let Fl: N-, N be a function 
for which F’i(x) = y can be checked lrI golynclmial time. F’l is said to be in 4~ if 
there is a polynomial randomized algc;rithm Al which computes Fi with success 
probability y > 0. By iterating A1 we can make its success probability arbitrary 
close tc 1. E.g., a function Fl: DL -3, RI is in Q R if there is a pOlynOmiai p and a 
polynomial time computable function 
(? for no answe:‘, SLsch that 
for some constant y > 0 and 
(2) there is a polynomial algorithm to check, given x, y whether Fl (J) = y. 
With 1x1 we denote the length of ,rhe string x over a binary alphabet. It is assumed 
lhat F1(x) = O(l.$‘“) for some constant ko. 
Example. To compute square roots modulo a prime is in A p [3,9. 96, 211. 
For a Las Vegas algorithm Al which computes a functioln Fl E AR the expected 
number of iterations until Fi(x) is found is 4 /y since 
~~O~.y.(I-y)‘-‘=l. 
*- Y 
The probability that Fl(x) is not found after c/y iterations t If A 1 is Ce-‘. 
Let 
X:(N,fl)+N, Y:N+N 
be two functions computable in exponential time. _X and Y are lallowed to have several 
function values for the same argument, i.e. they are relations, X(j, n I is defined for 
rz E /2GN (equal thiz domain of the second argument of X) and allj (0 CP < n). Assume 
that JX(j, PZ)~ = O(lnlj and I Y(n); = O(lnI). 
X is said to be Y-uniform, if for all n E 0 and for all j (0 < j < II), 
(1) if all values of X(j, n) are given by an oracle then Y(n) can be compllted ;n 
’ polynomial time in InI and 
(2) if one value of Y(n) is givl:;n by an oracle then Xl[j, n) csn be computed by a 
polynomial randomized algorithm with success probability b i, 1.e. X E AH. 
X is said to be randomly Y-uniform, 
(1) if for a given n and j one value of X(j, it) is given by an oracle then Y (n ) can be 
computed by a polynomial randomized algorithm with success probability ay, i.e. 
YE AR. (y a constant depending on X, (0 < y c 1)). 
(2) as (2) above. 
Immediate consequences of these definitions are 
(a) If X and Y are polvnomial time somputable, tht=n X is Y-uniform. 
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(b) If X is randomly uniform (for some Y which is not important here1 and if 
w(n) is iHl algorithm b1 i 1 ?;ch computes X(j, n) in time T(n) for the $rzctio;a E > 0 
of the j’s in the interval 0 c j < n, then there is a 
1 W. a(n) +qCfnl) 
@‘Y 
randomized algorithm to compute X(j, n) for an;fy j in the interval 0 < j C. n. y is 
a polynomial guarrnteed by condition (2) of the .%efinition of randcsm uniformity 
[lS, 201. 
Rabin [15] presents a problem which he shows to be randomly factoring-uniform, 
namely essentially square root extraction modulo a composite numib~:r The resulting 
signature method has the property that about 4 0% d!i messages can t e signed directly 
(without randomization). In t is paper a new si~~ture system is proposed which 
has several advantages 
(a) with respect o Rabin’s system [151: 
(1) IIalf of the messages can be signed dire%& ;: without randomization. (This 
saves about a factor of two for signature pr&uction.) 
(2) It is faster. To produce a signature requires orrly one exponentration 
modulo a large r&mber as in the RSA public key cryptosystem [17]. 
(b) with respect o other systems (for an overview see [lo, 12,221): The signature 
forging function is proven to be randomly factoring uniform, which means that 
signature forging is as difficult as factoring a large rumber. 
The following two technical emmata pre used lak::r. 
Lemma A. Let ~1, s2, (sl> s2 b 0) be positive integers, nnd let pl, ~2, l l . , pm be m 
dis tine tprimes, so that 
p*-1Isrs2, 
Pm -+a--S2. 
Vj 2 0: j”* = j’2 ‘mod pip;;! l . l p,). 
ProPof. Let n = plgz . l l pm. 
Case I: gcd(j, k ) - 1. By Fermat’s theorem 
‘S1 - J = js2+klfplm1) s js2 (mod PI), 
‘Sl _ 
j = js2+k2( p2--1) 7 j”’ (m(jcj p2), 
. 
“Sl - j = js2+kk(hn-1) s j”” qrnod p,) 
for certain &I, k2, . . g , km. 
Case 2: gcd(j, n)> 1. 
(a) gcd(,j, n) = FZ + is1 = is2 = 0 (mod n), 
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(b) gcd(j,+=pI+j=O(modpI)-,j”i=js*fO(mocl~p~). 
For the other primes we have by Case 1: 
I “’ = js2 (mod pi) (2 s i s m). 
The result follows by the Chinese remainder tk;Ilrem. 
The following lenlrlla will be important for the digital signature method described 
later. 
Lemma B. Let n be the product of 2 distinct primes of the form pl = 4& - 1, 
p2 = 4k2 - 1 and let 
k 
W-1 
=--2kIkz+l(=2klk2-kl-k2+l). 
4 
(a) Vj 20: j4& = j2 (mod ra), 
(b) Vc(c a quadratic residue): ck = & (mod n). 
P~osf, (a) is a special case of Lemma A. 
(b) c is a quadratic residue mod e, iff (C/PI) = (c/pz) = 1, -where (c;p) is the 
Legendre symbol. (C/PI) = 1 iiT c(‘~-~“~ =1 (mod pl). This implies that c2&-l = 1 
(mod pl), hence c2& =c (mod ~1). 
A similar argument holds for p2 and therefore (by the Chinese remainder theorem) 
for all quadratic residues c modulo rt : 
c 2k =c (mod n), 
which implies 
ck=&(modn). 
2. Uai%rmity results 
In this section four uniformity results are given which are relevant to the 
unforgeability of digital signatures. Proposition 1 is a generalization of an observa- 
tion made by Legen&e ([S] or see [?, p. 3511) and Corollary 2 generalizes a result 
n [lS]. Theorem 3 and Corollary 4 are the main results of this paper. 
First six functions are defined which will be employed k the uniformity re:sults. 
The arguments of a function 9re denoted as ‘input’ and the function value as ‘output’. 
FACTORfNGd, (d 3 2) 
input: rz =prlpp . - 4 p:, r 3 2, the primes pl, p2, . . . , pr all distinct, odd WX!I of 
the form dk + 1. 
output: f, a nontrivial factor of II. 
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FAc3TOR~NG~,, (d 2 2) 
inpat fi! =prlp;:’ l l . ~7, r 2 2, the primes ~1, ~2, . . . 1 pr all distinct, odd and havkng 
the property that dl(p - 4.) and gcd ((p - l)jd, d) = 1. (E.g. for d = 2 the 
primes pi, g2, l l l , pr must be of the form ~,1- - 1; for d = ?I of the form 
18R + 13 or 18k + 7.) 
output: fi 8 rzntrivial factor of n. 
ROQGLL, c (dz52) 
input: fl =pl”pz”’ l u l ~2, r a 2, the primes pr1p2 l 9 D 7 all distinct, odd and of 
the form dk + 1. 
c, (0 <c < n) a dth power esidue mod n. 
output :, All dth roots of c mod tz. 
l!kam@e. d = 2; the 4 square roots of 4 (mod 21) are ~-2, =tS. 
As RC?I:IT~A~~, but only one dth roct is required as output. 
Sd.k&, (d 3 2) 
input: n = p;I’p;Z l 9 l ~7, r a 2, the primes p;lp;’ l l l pp all distinct, ode and 
ha,ving the property that (s! (p - 1) and gcd(( p - 1)/d, d) = 1. 
j, (0+32). 
output: AU solutions for s of sa2= jd (mod n). 
Exampk. d = 2; the 4 soButions of s4= j2 (mod 21) for j = 2 are s = *4, s = *lo. 
S”“J;, (d 3 2) 
As Sd2Jd ALL9 but only one solution is required as output. 
bra 1. If ROOTd AL&z, c) iS known, then FACTORIIVG&Z) CdVt bf? computed 
e@cien tly* 
Proof. If gti(c, n) # 1 (gcd(d, n) # 1), then gcd(c, n) (gcd(d, n)) is a nontrivial factor 
of n. If gcd(c, n) =-- 1, then if n contains Y distinct odd primes, then there are u’” 
distinct dth roots of c modulo n. Namely, jd = c (mod pi”‘), (i = 1,2, . . . , r) has d 
distinct solutions &ce gcd(d, pi - 1) = d. Each +tuple of solutions for the r distinct 
prime powers gives a distinct solution modulo n and therefore there are d’ distinct 
solutions modulo n. (Note that if p ;q an odd prime, p does not divide c and p 
does not divide dI *hen if jd = c (mod p) is solvable, so is id = c (mod ~7”) for all 
v 2 1 and there is the same number of solutions (see e.g. [6, Section’4.2.3f)J 
NOW Iet t =Z c j/d (mod n) an 3 consider 
.d 
J -fd,(j_f)(jd-'tjd-2t+. . .~jt~-~+t~-')(modn), 
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The number of distinct solutions of 
(id-’ +jd-*t + 8 l l +jtd-* + td-‘) E 0 (mod n) 
for j (t fixed) is at most (d - 1): since there are at most d - 1 solutions modulo ~7, 
(i = 1,2, . . . J t). (Namely, if f(x) is a polynomial of degree d and the coefficient of 
xd is 1, then the congruence f(x) = 0 (mod p) has no more than d distinct solutions 
modulo p, where r is a prime.) j - t = 0 (mod n) has one solution an 
~(d, r) = d’ - ((d -- 1)’ + i) solutions 1 yield zero divisors modulo n, i.e. for at least 
~el(d, r) solutions j: 
(i - t)(jd.-’ + jd-*t + l l l + jtd-* + tdV1) = 0 (mod n) 
without the factors being zero. Hence gcd(j - t, n) yields a nontrivial factor of n 
for such a j. 
Corollary 2. If there is an oracle which computes ROOTf(n, c: for a random c, then 
FAcrORINGd(n) can be co.mputed efficiently with probability ay(d> > 0. 
Proof. Let c = jd mod n be a dth power residue, j (0 < j < n) randomly chosen. Let 
t be the dth root returned by ROOT? on input c. A simple counting argument shows 
that at least with probability 
cx(d, r) = 
d’-((d-?‘+I) 
d’ 
the number gcd(t - j, n) is a nontrivial factor of n. 
Theorem 3. §d2.&L is FACTORINGR,-uniform for r = 2. 
Proof. First it is shown that property (1) of the definition of uniformity holds for 
arbitrary r. W.1.o.g. it is assumed that gcd(d, n ) = 1 
shown that, given a i (0 <: j < ?t), there is an s, so that 
S d2=jd (mod n). 
This congruence holds, iff it holds modulo the prime powers ~7, (i = 1,2, . . . , r). 
and gcd(j, n) = 1. First it is 
If p is a-prime, then c is a d* power residue (mod p) iff 
C(p-l)‘a =1 (mod p), 
where g = gcd(d$ p - 1.). c is a dth power residue (mod p) iff 
c(~“‘)‘~ st 1 (mod p), 
where h = gcd(d, p - 1) (see e.g. [6]). Hence any dth power residue is a d* power 
residue iff g = h, Iwhich ,hoIds if p - 1 = &I, where k1 satisfies gcd(d, kl) = 1. ‘Xte 
primes prescribed in the definition of FACTORMG~, have this property. 
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Let sly ~2, . . . , sd’ be the d’ solutions of sdL E jd (mod n), where t is the rrumber 
of distinct primes in n. (To determine the number of distinct solutions, use the fact 
that if sd ~5 c (mod p) is solvable there are exactly gcd(d, p - 1) solutions, if TP is a 
prime (see e.g. [6, p+. 47]:1.) 
First it is shown that the dth powers of these solutions are congru,:nt module H, 
i.e. 
&E&E” . l =s$ (mod n). 
Let c = jd mod is. Th& c = sd2 (mod n) and c = sd (mod n) have bath d I‘ distinct 
solutions. ‘The claim fc ~110~s by a simple counting argument. 
Now, since all dth roots of s are known, Proposition 1 shows that a factor can 
be determined efficier tly. 
It remains to be shown that property (2) of the definition’of uniformity holds. 
Berlekamp [3] gives dn efficient randomized algorithm to compute ith roots modulo 
primes or prime powers (see also Rabin [16]). For square roots Lehmer [9] and 
Shanks [2l] give other eGcient randomized algorithms. Square roots module primes 
of the form 4k - 1 can be computed by one exponentiation (this fact is exploited 
is Lemma 3). Therefore, by Chinese remainde:ring, the Functions which compute 
dth roots ImrJdulo composite numbers (for which #Ihe factori:&ion is given) are in AR. 
fhro~kmy 4. Sd2Jf is randomly FACTORINGR,-UdfOtm ,‘w r = ‘2. 
Proof. Property (1) of the definition of uniformity holds for arbitrary r. The proof 
is similar to the prorTbf o Corollary 2. Let s be a solution and let 
t=~~=(j;L()“~ (modn) 
be an easily ::omputed dth root of jd. Since the prime factors of n are of the form 
dk + 1, again a counting argument snows that the probability is at least a! (d, r j that 
gcd(t - j, n) is a nontrivial factor of n for a random i;- (E.g. a(2,2) = i, cu(3,2) = $, 
Q(2,3) = f, a(3,3) = 5.) 
Property (2), for which the assumption r = 2 :is ilecessary, is shown in the same 
way as in the proof of Theorem 3. 
3. A new signalme method 
A new signtiture method (suitable for a public key crypt0 system) is given in 
which half of tiie ml :ssages can be signed directly (without randomization) and for 
Gdhich the signature forgin; function is randomly factoring uniform. This implies 
that even if only a f.ew signatures (say 3) could be forged, then it would be that a 
large number could be efficiently factored. Since factoring is apparently a difficult 
task for certain carefully chosen composite numbc:2 b I? 7, 231 and since signature 
producing and checi;ing can be done efficiently, it is beFieved that the proposed 
method and its variants are of practical value. 
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Williams [24] (also influenced by Rabin [ 151) has given a digital signature method 
which has similar properties as the one presented here. But it is considerably more 
complicated and less convenient o use. 
The proposed signature method allows four distinct legal signatures for the same 
message. Furthermore the signature method allows an opponent to produce 
arbitrary many message/signature pairs, but the messages he can sign are very 
likely messages he is not interested in. Two messages are said to be equivalent, if 
they express the same meaning. 
The messages which are signed must have a maximal length of say c = 256 bits. 
Usually messages are longer and are compressed by a hashing function h known 
to parties A and B [P4, IS]. h must be a ‘good’ hashing function as expressed in 
the following engineering assumption: 
Assumption 1. During the lifetime of the hashing function it is never observed that 
two messages are mapped on the same compressed message. 
sigpttiture algorithm S4&, (M) 
input: Message Mr. 
output: 
secret: 
public: 
1. 
2. 
n and 2 distinct primes ~1, ~2, where pi = 4ki - l(i = 1,2), such that plp2 = n. 
Hashing function h. 
Signature s for n/r. 
The factorization of n. 
(or at least known to other party) 
n, h and an efficient algorithm for signature checking. 
repeat randomize M: 
Compress message & to a smaller message j, so that / jl s c by using the hashing 
function h. 
until (j/n) = 1; (* the expected number of repetitions is 2 *) 
Compute s, so that s4 - j* (mod n). Lemma B shows that the s computed by 
s := jk mod n, 
where k = 2k& - kr - kZ + 1 has the desired property. 
If gcd(j, n) > 1 (which is very unlikely), then message 1M should be slightly changed 
before it is signed. 
Complexity of signa We production 
Signature produ.ction involves randomizing 1M and applying the hashing function 
h twice on the average, plus one kth power exponentiation modulo n, k -C n. (For 
low level compiex:ity see [S].) 
Complexity of signature checking 
s is the signature of message M, %? 
s4= h(M)2 (mod n). 
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Therefore signature checking costs: 
1 application of the hashing function h 
14th power rodulo n 
12nd power modulo n 
1 comparison of numbers G n. 
The proof of Corollary 4 implies that it would be unsafe to sign compressed messages 
for which (j/n) = -1. It can also be seen directly: Observe ikat, glvg+n s and j, j is 
a square root of j* and s* is a square root of j’. By constructiorI j” has 4 square 
roots modullo II. Hence, if not (j = &s*) (mod n) then (j -s2, n) ~5 1 and we get a 
non-trivial factrra of n. This happens exactly if the Jacobi symbol ( l/n) = -1 since 
for a prime p of the form 4k - 1: 
(-$=-l+($=l. 
Complexity of signature forging 
Before q*e can apply the uniformity result (Corollary 49, we have to-make the 
following assumption: 
Assumption 2. Let M be a message. To find a signature for a message which is 
equivalent o M is as hard as finding a signature for a random message of length c. 
“Eheorema 5. Kf there is G fast method for signature forging when using method S”J”, 
r ’ .en there iC9 G fast method for factoring numbers of the form rt = ~11 p2 
(pi z 4ki - 1, i = 1,2). 
Proof. Let M be a message which an opponent would like to sign. The opponent 
has two possibilities: 
(a) He can exploit the existence of the hashing function and use a signature 
which he knows or which he can easily generate, This attack is ruled out by 
Assumption 1. 
(b) Without usin~~ the existence of the hashing function. By Assumption 2 this 
is ss hard as finding a signature for a random message of length c and therefore 
(by Corollary 4, witi:r d = 2) signature forging for this method is randomly FACTOR- 
h+=- uniform. 
r”?,dditionally it h\as to be shown that if we could produce a signature for a random 
message j which satisfies [j/n) = 1, then wc ctd?yld factor n. (This does not follow 
from Corollary 4.) Since we are working with primes of the form 4ki - 1 we have 
to distinguish only 2 cases: 
Case 1: j is a quadrci?! residue modnlo n, The 4 solutions of s4 = j2 (mod n) are the 
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square roots of j (Lemma B). Therefore we use the following randomized reduction: 
(1) choose a random s (0 G E s n); 
(2) j := s*; 
(31 find si such that s: = j* (mod n) 
Wigh probability i we have (s -si, n) # 1. 
case 2: -j is a quadratic residue modulo n. Note that j2=s4 (mod n) * c-j)*= 
s4(mod n). Hence this case reduces to the first one. 
Security requirement 
A signature for a message bf is never sent to a person who already has another 
signature for A4 
In order to satisfy this, it is necessary that e.g. a message which was prepared 
by somebody else who might already have a sigaature for that message is slightly 
changed in an unpredictable way (without changing the meaning) before it is signed. 
It has .:o be avoided that the signature algorithm can be misused as a square root 
extraction algorithm. (Recall that s* is a square root of j* (mod n).) 
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